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Summary 
 
In response to a request by Senator Chambliss, the Food and Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute has analyzed possible impacts of the October 2005 U.S. proposal in the 
WTO agricultural negotiations.   
 
In addition to a Baseline that continues current U.S. agricultural policies, we examined 
three alternative scenarios. 
 
• Unilateral No Compensation scenario.  The United States reduces grain, oilseed, 
and cotton loan rates and dairy price supports by 11% and target prices by 7% 
over a five year period.  The U.S. sugar tariff-rate quota is increased by 7.5% of 
1999-2001 average consumption levels, and sugar loan rates are reduced by 16%.  
To isolate impacts of U.S. policy changes, no policy changes in other countries 
are assumed in this scenario. 
  
• Multilateral No Compensation scenario.  The same changes in U.S. policy are 
implemented as in the Unilateral scenario, but other countries are required to 
make policy changes consistent with the October U.S. proposal.  A global 
analysis of this scenario was conducted and the results are provided in a separate 
report issued by our colleagues at Iowa State University. 
 
• Multilateral with Compensation scenario.  Assumptions are the same as in the 
previous scenario, with one exception: instead of reducing target prices by 7%, 
target prices are set at baseline levels and direct payments are increased by 7% of 
the target price.  Given current payment formulas, this has the same effect on 
counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) as a 7% reduction in target prices. 
 
FAPRI’s stochastic model is used to examine 500 possible outcomes of the scenarios for 
U.S. agricultural markets, given a series of assumptions about how the proposal would be 
implemented.  Key results are summarized in Table 1. 
 
• The assumed reductions in loan rates and support prices would sharply reduce the 
U.S. Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS).  Product-specific AMS in 2012-2014 
would be cut in half by the two Multilateral scenarios, from an average of $9.4 
billion per year in the baseline to an average of $4.7 billion. 
 
• The average level of AMS under the two Multilateral scenarios is well below the 
U.S. proposed AMS limit of $7.6 billion.  However, the AMS varies with market 
prices.  Even though the average levels are well below the proposed limit, in 4% 
to 5% of the annual stochastic outcomes, prices are low enough and payments 
large enough that the AMS exceeds the proposed limit.  In 15.6% of the stochastic 
outcomes, the AMS limit is exceeded in some year between 2008 and 2014. 
 
• Similarly, either of the Multilateral scenarios would result in a significant 
reduction in CCPs.  Average CCP levels would fall well below the proposed limit 
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on blue box spending, but in approximately 5% of the stochastic outcomes each 
year, prices would be low enough to result in CCPs in excess of the limit. 
 
• Net government outlays would be reduced sharply in the scenarios without 
compensation.  The decline in government sending averages about $3.5 billion 
per year in the Unilateral scenario.  With the increase in prices that results from 
reforms in other countries, U.S. farm program outlays are further reduced in the 
Multilateral No Compensation scenario. 
 
• The Multilateral with Compensation scenario results in an increase in direct 
payments that offsets much of the savings in loan program benefits and CCPs.  
Net government outlays are still slightly below baseline levels on average, but 
direct payments exceed baseline levels by $3.4 billion per year.  This increase is 
consistent with U.S. WTO obligations only if direct payments do not count 
toward AMS or blue box limits. 
 
• Without considering impacts on foreign markets of the U.S. proposal, reducing 
target prices and loan rates would reduce crop producer returns plus payments, as 
indicated in the results for the Unilateral scenario.   
 
• In the Multilateral No Compensation scenario, the increase in prices resulting 
from increased exports offsets at least some of the reduction in payments.  
Returns plus payments exceed baseline levels for rice producers, given a sharp 
increase in prices caused by increased U.S. exports.  Of five major crops, only for 
cotton do returns plus payments remain well below baseline levels. 
 
• In the Multilateral with Compensation scenario, the increase in direct payments 
further offsets reductions in CCPs and loan benefits.  For rice, wheat, corn, and 
soybeans, average estimated returns plus payments exceed baseline levels.  Only 
for cotton do average returns plus payments remain below baseline levels. 
 
• The Multilateral scenarios result in a $2.0 billion increase in aggregate cash 
receipts from crop marketings, and a $4.2 billion increase in livestock receipts.  
Livestock receipts increase in response to higher prices for cattle, hogs, poultry, 
and milk, due to increased U.S. meat and dairy product exports. 
 
• The increases in receipts are partially offset by reduced government payments and 
increased production costs in the two Multilateral scenarios. 
 
• Net farm income falls by an average of $1.9 billion per year in the Unilateral 
scenario.  In the Multilateral No Compensation scenario, increased crop and 
livestock cash receipts result in average net farm income $1.3 billion per year 
above baseline levels.  The increased direct payments in the Multilateral with 
Compensation scenario result in net farm income that exceeds baseline levels by 
$3.4 billion per year. 
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Table 1. Summary of results 
Baseline 2012-14 Averages Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Policies Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
Assumed changes in:
  Loan rates (except sugar) -11% -11% -11%
  Sugar loan rate -16% -16% -16%
  Milk support price -11% -11% -11%
  Target prices -7% -7% 0%
  Direct payment rates 0% 0% *
WTO indicators (million dollars)
  Product-specific AMS 9,376 5,012 4,657 4,668 -46.5% -50.3% -50.2%
  AMS limit 7,641 7,641 7,641 7,641 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Blue box support (CCPs) 3,094 1,814 1,522 1,536 -41.4% -50.8% -50.4%
  Blue box limit 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  % of outcomes exceeding: (proportion)
     AMS limit 58.5% 6.3% 4.3% 4.5% -89.2% -92.7% -92.3%
     Blue Box limit 24.3% 7.6% 4.9% 5.0% -68.8% -79.7% -79.5%
(million dollars)
Net CCC outlays 16,537 13,062 12,516 15,968 -21.0% -24.3% -3.4%
Crop returns plus payments (dollars per base acre planted to the crop)
  Corn 423.97 408.65 418.32 433.95 -3.6% -1.3% 2.4%
  Soybeans 253.51 245.15 247.07 257.39 -3.3% -2.5% 1.5%
  Wheat 177.45 174.83 178.88 186.55 -1.5% 0.8% 5.1%
  Upland cotton 581.90 545.07 545.18 571.15 -6.3% -6.3% -1.8%
  Rice 767.94 744.79 811.57 841.24 -3.0% 5.7% 9.5%
Farm income (million dollars)
  Crop receipts 125,125 125,196 127,131 127,114 0.1% 1.6% 1.6%
  Livestock receipts 112,190 112,069 116,407 116,386 -0.1% 3.8% 3.7%
  Government payments 16,655 13,429 12,902 16,352 -19.4% -22.5% -1.8%
  Production costs 237,704 236,215 239,117 240,479 -0.6% 0.6% 1.2%
  Net farm income 53,089 51,186 54,367 56,533 -3.6% 2.4% 6.5%
* Direct payment rates are increased by 7% of the target price for each commodity.
Baseline:  Mean values from FAPRI early 2005 stochastic baseline, adjusted for elimination of Step 2 program
Unilateral No Compensation scenario: Reduces crop loan rates and milk price supports by 11%, sugar price
   supports by 16%, and target prices by 7%, increases U.S. sugar TRQ, with no policy changes in other countries
Multilateral No Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except other countries change policies consistent
   with provisions of the October 2005 U.S. WTO proposal
Multilateral with Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except target prices set at baseline levels and
   direct payment rates increased by 7% of the baseline target price  
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Introduction 
 
Senator Saxby Chambliss, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry sent FAPRI a letter requesting analysis of the U.S. proposal in the 
WTO agricultural negotiations.  This report and companion reports by colleagues at Iowa 
State University (CARD Working Paper 05-WP417) and Texas A&M University (AFPC 
Briefing Paper 05-7) are in response to the Chairman’s request. 
 
The assumptions used in the analysis primarily derive from a summary of the U.S. 
proposal released by the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) on October 10, 
2005.  This information was supplemented by conversations with USTR and other U.S. 
officials.  FAPRI considers these assumptions reasonable given available information, but 
other interpretations of the U.S. proposal are certainly possible.  The assumptions used in 
this analysis should not be considered official U.S. government policy. 
 
This report compares U.S. results under a baseline and three alternative scenarios.  
Analysis is conducted with FAPRI’s stochastic model of U.S. agricultural markets.  
Unless otherwise noted, reported results represent averages of 500 stochastic outcomes. 
 
1) The Baseline assumes a continuation of current agricultural policies in the United 
States and other countries.  FAPRI’s stochastic baseline prepared in early 2005 
serves as the baseline for this analysis with one adjustment: the cotton Step 2 
program is eliminated as of August 1, 2006.  See the next section of the report for 
an explanation of why this adjustment was judged appropriate. 
 
2) The Unilateral No Compensation scenario assumes a series of U.S. policy 
changes that would satisfy the terms of the U.S. proposal.  These include 
reductions in crop loan rates, target prices, and dairy support prices, as well as 
increases in tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for sugar and butter.  In order to isolate the 
effects of domestic policy changes from those caused by policy response in other 
countries, this scenario assumes only the United States makes policy changes. 
 
3) The Multilateral No Compensation scenario makes the same U.S. policy 
assumptions as the Unilateral scenario.  The only difference is that other countries 
are also assumed to adjust policies to reduce internal supports, increase market 
access, and eliminate export subsidies as required by the U.S. proposal.  Global 
impacts of this scenario are reported in a companion report by our FAPRI 
colleagues at Iowa State University. 
 
4) The Multilateral with Compensation scenario makes the same U.S. and 
international assumptions as the Multilateral No Compensation scenario with one 
exception.  Instead of reducing target prices to limit U.S. blue box spending, the 
same effect on blue box spending is achieved by setting target prices at baseline 
levels and increasing U.S. direct payment rates.  This has the effect of 
significantly increasing U.S. farm program costs relative to the No Compensation 
scenarios, but still leaves spending below baseline levels. 
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U.S. Policy Assumptions 
 
Requirements of the U.S. Proposal 
 
1) A 60% reduction in the allowed level of current Aggregate Measure of Support 
(AMS) for the United States, from $19.1 billion to $7.6 billion.  We assume the 
reductions are made in a linear fashion between 2008 and 2012.  The EU AMS 
limit would be reduced by 83%. 
2) A redefined blue box, limited to no more than 2.5% of the 1999-2001 average 
value of agricultural production ($4.77 billion in the case of the United States).  
We assume that counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) would fall in the redefined 
blue box. 
3) Tariff reductions as described in the USTR release, with the highest tariffs being 
cut by 90% if the product is not classified as “sensitive.” 
4) For sensitive products, an increase in the TRQ.  Based on consultations with 
USTR, we assume the increase relative to current levels is 7.5% of 1999-2001 
domestic consumption.  No more than 1% of tariff lines qualify for sensitive 
product designation. 
5) The elimination of export subsidies by 2010. 
6) Establishment of a new “peace clause” that would inhibit cases under the WTO 
subsidies code, provided other requirements of the proposal are met. 
 
Baseline 
 
The reference point for our analysis is the FAPRI January 2005 baseline, with one 
adjustment: the elimination of cotton Step 2 payments.  WTO has ruled that the Step 2 
program is inconsistent with U.S. commitments under the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture.  Also, the House and Senate have both included the elimination of Step 2 in 
their FY 2006 budget reconciliation bills.  These two factors suggest it would be 
inappropriate to consider elimination of Step 2 to be a Doha Round effect, so the baseline 
for this analysis eliminates Step 2 payments at the end of the 2005/06 marketing year. 
 
Changes to Reduce the AMS 
 
There is no unique set of policy adjustments required for the U.S. to meet its proposed 
commitments.  For purposes of this analysis, all grain, oilseed, and cotton loan rates and 
dairy support prices were reduced by the same percentage to achieve the required 
reduction in AMS.   
 
To judge the appropriate level of reductions, FAPRI’s stochastic model was used to 
calculate the proportion of 500 outcomes where the U.S.-proposed WTO limits would be 
exceeded.  Loan rates and support prices were reduced until no more than 5% of the 
stochastic outcomes per year between 2012 and 2014 exceeded the WTO AMS limit.  
The required loan rate and milk support price reduction resulting from this procedure is 
11%.  Reductions were made in a linear fashion between marketing years 2007/08 and 
2011/12 for crops and between calendar years 2008 and 2012 for dairy.  Sugar loan rates 
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were reduced by 16% by 2011/12.  The larger reduction was necessary to avoid public 
stock accumulation, given the large estimated increase in U.S. imports.   
 
These changes in loan rates and support prices were applied to all three scenarios (see 
Table 2 for specific U.S. program provisions). 
 
Changes to Stay within the Blue Box Cap  
 
A similar procedure was used to determine how to make changes in the CCP program to 
comply with the redefined blue box limits. Target prices were reduced until the 
proportion of annual stochastic outcomes where CCPs exceeded the $4.77 billion cap 
dropped to 5%.  The required reduction is 7%.  The Unilateral and Multilateral No 
Compensation scenarios assume this 7% target price reduction.  Reductions are made in 
a linear fashion between 2007/08 and 2011/12. 
 
Several policy levers can be used to change CCP spending.  In the Multilateral with 
Compensation scenario, target prices are restored to baseline levels and direct payment 
rates are increased by 7% of the baseline target price.  CCP payments occur when the 
season-average farm price for a commodity falls below the target price minus the direct 
payment rate.  Either reducing target prices by 7% or increasing direct payment rates by 
7% of the baseline target price would have the same effect on CCPs, given a market 
price.  The two alternatives have dramatically different implications for farm program 
outlays and farm income.  While CCPs would be similar, direct payments would, of 
course, be much larger if direct payment rates were increased. 
 
Direct Payments and the Green Box 
 
The analysis assumes that direct payments can be classified in the green box.  A WTO 
ruling in the case brought by Brazil against the U.S. cotton program brings this 
assumption into question.  Implicitly, the analysis assumes either that the United States 
makes appropriate policy changes so direct payments qualify for the green box, or the 
Doha negotiations lead to green box rules that allow U.S. direct payments to qualify.  EU 
single farm payments are also assumed to qualify for the green box. 
 
Other U.S. Policy Changes 
 
The sugar and butter TRQs are expanded by 7.5% of average 1999-2001 consumption 
levels, as required for sensitive products.  U.S. tariffs on other products are also reduced 
as required by the U.S. proposal, and dairy export subsidies are eliminated. 
 
Foreign Policy Changes 
 
The Unilateral scenario assumes no changes in foreign agricultural policies, while the 
two Multilateral scenarios assume other countries modify their policies to conform to 
the U.S. proposal.  A companion publication by our colleagues at Iowa State University 
describes the changes in foreign policies and resulting impacts on international markets. 
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Table 2. U.S. policy assumptions 
2012 vs. Baseline
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Absolute Percent
Baseline (dollars per bushel, crop year)
  Corn loan rate 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95
  Corn target price 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63
  Corn direct payment rate 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
  Soybean loan rate 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
  Soybean target price 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80
  Soybean direct payment rate 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
  Wheat loan rate 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75
  Wheat target price 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.92
  Wheat direct payment rate 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
(cents per pound, crop year)
  Cotton loan rate 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00
  Cotton target price 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40
  Cotton direct payment rate 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67
(dollars per hundredweight, crop year)
  Rice loan rate 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50
  Rice target price 10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50
  Rice direct payment rate 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35
(cents per pound, crop year)
  Raw sugar loan rate 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00
(dollars per hundredweight, calendar year)
  Milk support price 9.90 9.90 9.90 9.90 9.90 9.90 9.90
(thousand short tons, crop year)
  Sugar non-NAFTA TRQ imports 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229
Unilateral and Multilateral
No Compensation scenarios (dollars per bushel, crop year)
  Corn loan rate 1.95 1.91 1.86 1.82 1.78 1.74 1.74 -0.21 -11.0%
  Corn target price 2.63 2.59 2.56 2.52 2.48 2.45 2.45 -0.18 -7.0%
  Corn direct payment rate 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.0%
  Soybean loan rate 5.00 4.89 4.78 4.67 4.56 4.45 4.45 -0.55 -11.0%
  Soybean target price 5.80 5.72 5.64 5.56 5.48 5.39 5.39 -0.41 -7.0%
  Soybean direct payment rate 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.0%
  Wheat loan rate 2.75 2.69 2.63 2.57 2.51 2.45 2.45 -0.30 -11.0%
  Wheat target price 3.92 3.87 3.81 3.76 3.70 3.65 3.65 -0.27 -7.0%
  Wheat direct payment rate 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.00 0.0%
(cents per pound,crop year)
  Cotton loan rate 52.00 50.86 49.71 48.57 47.42 46.28 46.28 -5.72 -11.0%
  Cotton target price 72.40 71.39 70.37 69.36 68.35 67.33 67.33 -5.07 -7.0%
  Cotton direct payment rate 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 0.00 0.0%
(dollars per hundredweight, crop year)
  Rice loan rate 6.50 6.36 6.21 6.07 5.93 5.79 5.79 -0.72 -11.0%
  Rice target price 10.50 10.35 10.21 10.06 9.91 9.77 9.77 -0.73 -7.0%
  Rice direct payment rate 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 0.00 0.0%
(cents per pound, crop year)
  Raw sugar loan rate 18.00 17.42 16.85 16.27 15.70 15.12 15.12 -2.88 -16.0%
(dollars per hundredweight, calendar year)
  Milk support price 9.90 9.90 9.68 9.46 9.25 9.03 8.81 -1.09 -11.0%
(thousand short tons, crop year)
  Sugar non-NAFTA TRQ imports 1,229 1,380 1,531 1,682 1,833 1,984 1,984 755 61.5%
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Table 2. U.S. policy assumptions, continued 
2012 vs. Baseline
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Absolute Percent
Multilateral with Compensation
scenario (dollars per bushel, crop year)
  Corn loan rate 1.95 1.91 1.86 1.82 1.78 1.74 1.74 -0.21 -11.0%
  Corn target price 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 0.00 0.0%
  Corn direct payment rate 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.18 65.8%
  Soybean loan rate 5.00 4.89 4.78 4.67 4.56 4.45 4.45 -0.55 -11.0%
  Soybean target price 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 0.00 0.0%
  Soybean direct payment rate 0.44 0.52 0.60 0.68 0.76 0.85 0.85 0.41 92.3%
  Wheat loan rate 2.75 2.69 2.63 2.57 2.51 2.45 2.45 -0.30 -11.0%
  Wheat target price 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.92 0.00 0.0%
  Wheat direct payment rate 0.52 0.57 0.63 0.68 0.74 0.79 0.79 0.27 52.8%
(cents per pound, crop year)
  Cotton loan rate 52.00 50.86 49.71 48.57 47.42 46.28 46.28 -5.72 -11.0%
  Cotton target price 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40 72.40 0.00 0.0%
  Cotton direct payment rate 6.67 7.68 8.70 9.71 10.72 11.74 11.74 5.07 76.0%
(dollars per hundredweight, crop year)
  Rice loan rate 6.50 6.36 6.21 6.07 5.93 5.79 5.79 -0.72 -11.0%
  Rice target price 10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 10.50 0.00 0.0%
  Rice direct payment rate 2.35 2.50 2.64 2.79 2.94 3.09 3.09 0.74 31.3%
(cents per pound, crop year)
  Raw sugar loan rate 18.00 17.42 16.85 16.27 15.70 15.12 15.12 -2.88 -16.0%
(dollars per hundredweight, calendar year)
  Milk support price 9.90 9.90 9.68 9.46 9.25 9.03 8.81 -1.09 -11.0%
(thousand short tons, crop year)
  Sugar non-NAFTA TRQ imports 1,229 1,380 1,531 1,682 1,833 1,984 1,984 755 61.5%
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U.S. Domestic Support Calculations 
 
FAPRI has recently added to its models a set of equations to calculate the U.S. AMS and 
other WTO domestic support measures under alternative accounting rules (see FAPRI 
Policy Working Paper #1-05 at www.fapri.missouri.edu). 
 
Under the U.S. proposal, the U.S. current AMS would be comprised primarily of 
marketing loan benefits for grains, oilseeds, and cotton, plus the imputed value to 
producers of the sugar and dairy price support programs.  Marketing loan benefits are tied 
to loan rates and indicators of market prices; at sufficiently high prices, marketing loan 
benefits may be zero, but they can be quite large when prices fall below loan rates.  In 
stochastic analysis, the range of possible outcomes for marketing loan benefits is wide.   
 
In contrast, under current accounting practices, the AMS for dairy and sugar is simply 
U.S. production multiplied by the difference between the U.S. support price and a fixed 
reference price based on world prices in the 1980s.  Only changes in production or the 
support price can change the AMS for sugar and dairy.  Note that with current policies in 
place, the AMS for dairy totals about $5 billion per year between 2012 and 2014, and the 
sugar AMS totals $1.3 billion per year (Table 3). 
 
The 500 outcomes in FAPRI’s stochastic baseline result an average current AMS of $9.4 
billion per year between 2012 and 2014.  That only exceeds the proposed limit by less 
than $2 billion, but the averages do not tell the full story.  In order to ensure that in 95% 
of stochastic outcomes for any given year the United States does not exceed the proposed 
$7.6 billion limit, the average AMS must be considerably less than the limit.  Given all 
the assumptions of this analysis, the average value of the product-specific AMS is about 
$4.7 billion in the two Multilateral scenarios, about half the baseline level. 
 
While the proportion of outcomes where product-specific support exceeds the limit in any 
given year is 5% or less, there are more outcomes where the limit is exceeded at some 
point.  Given all the assumptions of the analysis, product-specific support exceeds the 
AMS limit in some year between 2008 and 2014 in 15.6% of the stochastic outcomes. 
 
A similar story holds in the case of the blue box limit.  Baseline CCPs average $3.1 
billion per year from 2012-2014, but in 24% of the stochastic outcomes for each year, 
baseline CCPs exceed the proposed $4.8 billion cap.  In order to keep U.S. CCPs below 
$4.8 billion in 95% of the stochastic outcomes each year, policy parameters are set so that 
average CCP spending is about $1.5 billion—less than one-third of the cap.   
 
These results do not consider the possible effects of nonproduct-specific support on the 
AMS calculations.  Crop insurance is the largest component remaining in the nonproduct- 
specific amber box category.  Under 2001 U.S. accounting practices, crop insurance 
expenditures could cause U.S. nonproduct-specific support to exceed the proposed de 
minimis limit of 2.5% of the value of production.  These estimates assume that some 
change is made either in the crop insurance program or in the way it is reported.
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Table 3. U.S. domestic support calculations 
Baseline Absolute 2012-14 LEVEL Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Policies Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
Current total AMS (million dollars)
Barley 40 13 9 9 -66.4% -78.5% -77.3%
Corn 989 291 136 139 -70.6% -86.3% -86.0%
Cotton (upland) 735 389 339 340 -47.1% -53.9% -53.7%
Dairy 5,030 2,955 2,989 2,989 -41.2% -40.6% -40.6%
Minor oilseeds 14 6 4 5 -60.2% -69.2% -68.1%
Oats 7 2 1 1 -67.3% -81.1% -79.4%
Peanuts 27 11 10 10 -59.6% -62.9% -62.5%
Rice 230 156 60 60 -31.9% -73.9% -73.9%
Sorghum 49 14 9 9 -70.5% -81.9% -80.8%
Soybeans 814 278 216 221 -65.9% -73.5% -72.9%
Sugar 1,299 783 783 783 -39.7% -39.7% -39.7%
Wheat 43 12 1 1 -70.8% -96.9% -96.7%
All other 100 100 100 100 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Product-specific total 9,376 5,012 4,657 4,668 -46.5% -50.3% -50.2%
AMS limit 7,641 7,641 7,641 7,641 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Blue box (CCPs) 3,094 1,814 1,522 1,536 -41.4% -50.8% -50.4%
Blue box limit 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Proportion of outcomes where:
  Product-specific exceeds 58.5% 6.3% 4.3% 4.5% -89.2% -92.7% -92.3%
  AMS limit
  CCPs exceed blue box 24.3% 7.6% 4.9% 5.0% -68.8% -79.7% -79.5%
  limit
Baseline:  Mean values from FAPRI early 2005 stochastic baseline, adjusted for elimination of Step 2 program
Unilateral No Compensation scenario: Reduces crop loan rates and milk price supports by 11%, sugar price
   supports by 16%, and target prices by 7%, increases U.S. sugar TRQ, with no policy changes in other countries
Multilateral No Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except other countries change policies consistent
   with provisions of the October 2005 U.S. WTO proposal
Multilateral with Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except target prices set at baseline levels and
   direct payment rates increased by 7% of the baseline target price  
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U.S. Crop Acreage 
 
Reductions in target prices and loan rates lead to reductions in the area planted to major 
field crops if there is no offsetting increase in returns from the market.  In the Unilateral 
scenario, the total amount of cropland planted to 10 major field crops declines by about 
820,000 acres (0.3%) between 2012 and 2014 (Table 4).   
 
The largest absolute and proportional declines in acreage in the Unilateral scenario occur 
for upland cotton.  Given the projected prices in FAPRI’s baseline from early 2005, 
cotton is more dependent on marketing loan benefits and CCPs than other crops.  
Reducing those payments, therefore, has a much larger impact on acreage for cotton than 
on acreage for other crops. 
 
Across 500 alternative outcomes for commodity markets, acreage also declines slightly 
for several other crops in the Unilateral scenario.  Wheat and hay are the only crops with 
increased acreage in the scenario.  Given baseline wheat prices, wheat is less dependent 
on marketing loan benefits and CCPs than other crops.  The Unilateral scenario, 
therefore, reduces returns to other crops more than it reduces returns to wheat, so 
producers shift area from other crops to wheat.  A similar story holds for hay, which does 
not receive marketing loan benefits or CCPs. 
 
In the Multilateral No Compensation scenario, acreage exceeds baseline levels for corn, 
wheat, and rice, with by far the largest proportional increases for rice.  The increase in 
grain, and especially rice, prices more than offsets the impacts of reduced payments, and 
farmers shift acreage from other crops into wheat, corn, and rice.  
 
Cotton acreage is actually lower than in the unilateral scenario, as the increase in grain 
prices draws land away from cotton production.  Soybean acreage also declines slightly, 
as the increase in soybean prices is smaller than the increase in prices of corn and other 
competing crops. 
 
The Multilateral with Compensation scenario yields very similar results to the no 
compensation scenario.  The increase in direct payments in the scenario marginally 
increases acreage for every crop (except hay) relative to the no-compensation scenario. 
 
Note that the overall changes in area devoted to crop production are quite small in all of 
these scenarios.  Total 10-crop area declines by 0.3% in the Unilateral scenario and 
increases by 0.1% in the Multilateral with Compensation scenario.  In FAPRI’s model, 
the total area devoted to crop production is not very responsive to changes in market 
prices and payments.  Payments less tied to production and prices (e.g., direct payments) 
have smaller impacts on total area devoted to crop production than do market returns and 
payments directly tied to current production and prices (e.g., marketing loan benefits). 
 
The proportional changes for individual crops are much larger than the changes in total 
crop area, as producers switch crops based on changes in relative returns.
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Table 4. U.S. crop acreage planted 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
(million acres)
Corn 84.02 -0.23 0.30 0.33 -0.3% 0.4% 0.4%
Soybeans 72.71 -0.08 -0.41 -0.34 -0.1% -0.6% -0.5%
Wheat 57.51 0.13 0.32 0.54 0.2% 0.6% 0.9%
Sorghum 7.80 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.7% -0.9% -0.3%
Barley 4.12 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -1.0% -0.5% 0.1%
Oats 3.98 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.5% 0.1% 0.9%
Rice 3.37 -0.04 0.18 0.19 -1.3% 5.4% 5.5%
Peanuts 1.45 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.9% -1.0% -1.0%
Sunflowers 1.96 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.1% -0.3% 0.2%
Upland cotton 12.93 -0.45 -0.54 -0.52 -3.5% -4.2% -4.0%
10 major crops 249.85 -0.82 -0.25 0.21 -0.3% -0.1% 0.1%
Hay area harvested 63.05 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.1% 0.2% 0.1%
10 major crops plus hay 312.91 -0.75 -0.12 0.29 -0.2% 0.0% 0.1%
Baseline:  Mean values from FAPRI early 2005 stochastic baseline, adjusted for elimination of Step 2 program
Unilateral No Compensation scenario: Reduces crop loan rates and milk price supports by 11%, sugar price
   supports by 16%, and target prices by 7%, increases U.S. sugar TRQ, with no policy changes in other countries
Multilateral No Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except other countries change policies consistent
   with provisions of the October 2005 U.S. WTO proposal
Multilateral with Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except target prices set at baseline levels and
   direct payment rates increased by 7% of the baseline target price  
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U.S. Crop Prices 
 
Crop prices change in response to changes in U.S. production, export demand, and feed 
demand from the livestock sector (Table 5). 
 
In the Unilateral scenario, price changes are uniformly small.  Only peanut, rice, and 
cotton prices exceed baseline levels by more than 1% between 2012/13 and 2014/15, and 
no average price change exceeds 2.5%.  The slight reduction in production for most crops 
corresponds with an increase in market prices for all crops other than hay.  Even wheat 
prices increase marginally on average, given the cross-effects from other crops. 
 
In the Multilateral No Compensation scenario, the increase in export demand for most 
commodities results in a further increase in market prices.  By far the largest price 
increase occurs for rice.  The estimated increase in Japanese and Korean rice imports 
causes a large increase in demand for short and medium-grain rice.  The analysis 
conducted using FAPRI’s global model indicates that short and medium-grain rice prices 
would increase by 28%, with a more modest 9% increase in long-grain rice prices.  The 
stochastic model used for the analysis reported here does not distinguish types of rice, but 
suggests a 19% average increase in rice prices between 2012/13 and 2014/15.1 
 
Prices also increase by 2% to 4% for wheat, corn, and other coarse grains.  Average corn 
prices increase by almost 4% from baseline levels, as both export demand and feed 
demand increase.  Soybean prices increase by an average of 1.5%, in part because of 
increased demand for soybean oil, and in part because of reductions in soybean supplies 
as acreage shifts from soybean to grain production. 
 
Upland cotton prices increase by slightly less than 2% from baseline levels, primarily 
because of the reduction in U.S. production. 
 
Most of these estimates of average price impacts are relatively close to the estimates of 
price changes in the global deterministic analysis.  The similarities are by construction, as 
the stochastic U.S. model was calibrated to the results of the global deterministic analysis 
for a particular set of assumptions.  The stochastic averages reported here sometimes 
differ somewhat from the point estimates in the global analysis, primarily because farm 
programs have impacts on production and prices that differ systematically depending on 
starting market conditions. 
 
The Multilateral with Compensation scenario yields almost the same prices as the no 
compensation scenario.  Prices are marginally lower, given marginally increased 
production. 
                                                 
1 The estimated 19% average rice price increase from the stochastic analysis exceeds the estimated 14% 
increase in the global FAPRI analysis.  Part of the difference is explained by model differences, but part of 
it is explained by a smaller average increase in rice production in the stochastic analysis than in the 
deterministic global analysis.  This occurs because, in many of the stochastic outcomes, even a large 
increase in rice prices from low baseline levels merely means producers get more of their income from the 
market and less from the loan program, with little net effect on supply-inducing returns. 
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Table 5. U.S. crop prices 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
(dollars per bushel)
Corn 2.31 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.4% 3.9% 3.7%
Soybeans 5.41 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.3% 1.5% 1.3%
Wheat 3.59 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.1% 2.9% 2.6%
Sorghum 2.17 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.4% 3.2% 3.0%
Barley 2.56 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.6% 2.9% 2.6%
Oats 1.60 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.4% 4.3% 3.7%
(dollars per cwt)
Rice 7.94 0.10 1.50 1.50 1.2% 18.9% 18.9%
(cents per pound)
Upland cotton 50.81 0.65 0.93 0.90 1.3% 1.8% 1.8%
Peanuts 19.81 0.48 0.55 0.53 2.4% 2.8% 2.7%
Sunflowerseed 11.80 0.05 0.25 0.22 0.4% 2.1% 1.9%
Soybean oil 23.39 0.12 0.62 0.57 0.5% 2.6% 2.4%
(dollars per ton)
Soybean meal 175.72 0.27 1.57 1.36 0.2% 0.9% 0.8%
Hay 96.47 -0.29 1.15 1.29 -0.3% 1.2% 1.3%
Baseline:  Mean values from FAPRI early 2005 stochastic baseline, adjusted for elimination of Step 2 program
Unilateral No Compensation scenario: Reduces crop loan rates and milk price supports by 11%, sugar price
   supports by 16%, and target prices by 7%, increases U.S. sugar TRQ, with no policy changes in other countries
Multilateral No Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except other countries change policies consistent
   with provisions of the October 2005 U.S. WTO proposal
Multilateral with Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except target prices set at baseline levels and
   direct payment rates increased by 7% of the baseline target price  
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U.S. Crop Exports 
 
In the Unilateral scenario, reduced U.S. production and increased prices translate into a 
decline in exports for most crops (Table 6).  The largest proportional reductions in 
exports occur for cotton and rice, the two commodities with the largest proportional 
reductions in production because of the reduction in government payments. 
 
Because the model used for this analysis does not include a detailed representation of 
world markets, it is not equipped to estimate the impacts of changes in foreign 
agricultural and trade policies on U.S. exports.  To capture these effects in the 
Multilateral No Compensation scenario, the model was calibrated to the impacts 
estimated in FAPRI’s global deterministic analysis of the U.S. proposal.  
 
The largest proportional increase in U.S. exports occurs for rice.  Given terms of the U.S. 
proposal, even though Japan and South Korea can shield their rice markets from large 
tariff reductions by declaring rice a “sensitive” product, the trade-off is a sharp increase 
in the rice TRQ and thus in rice imports.   
 
Corn exports increase in response to reduced production and increased consumption of 
corn in the European Union.  Wheat exports increase because of reduced competition 
from Canada and Russia and increased imports by Japan and China.  Cotton exports 
decline because of reduced U.S. production and an absence of significant changes in 
foreign cotton markets. 
 
Soybean exports decline slightly in response to reduced U.S. production and an increase 
in the share of soybeans crushed domestically because of larger crushing margins. 
Soybean oil exports increase because of reduced tariffs in some importing countries, 
while soybean meal exports decline in response to reduced livestock production in 
Europe and Japan.   
 
Where the average changes in exports in this report differ from those in the global 
deterministic analysis, the differences are often because the average changes in U.S. 
production and prices are slightly different than the changes estimated in the global 
analysis.  The companion report by FAPRI-Iowa State (CARD Working Paper 05-
WP417) provides more detail on world market developments and the root causes of 
changes in U.S. trade resulting from the U.S. proposal. 
 
The crop export effects in the Multilateral with Compensation scenario are almost the 
same as in the no compensation scenario.  Exports are marginally greater than in the no 
compensation scenario, give marginally lower prices. 
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Table 6. U.S. crop exports 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
(million bushels)
Corn 2,707 -24 38 42 -0.9% 1.4% 1.5%
Soybeans 929 -2 -15 -13 -0.2% -1.6% -1.4%
Wheat 1,015 2 15 22 0.2% 1.5% 2.1%
Sorghum 204 -1 -3 -3 -0.7% -1.5% -1.3%
(million hundredweight)
Rice 126.80 -2.82 15.23 15.38 -2.2% 12.0% 12.1%
(million bales)
Upland cotton 14.00 -0.58 -0.67 -0.65 -4.1% -4.8% -4.6%
(thousand tons)
Soybean meal 6,164 -29 -813 -806 -0.5% -13.2% -13.1%
(million pounds)
Soybean oil 1,721 -16 73 76 -1.0% 4.2% 4.4%
Baseline:  Mean values from FAPRI early 2005 stochastic baseline, adjusted for elimination of Step 2 program
Unilateral No Compensation scenario: Reduces crop loan rates and milk price supports by 11%, sugar price
   supports by 16%, and target prices by 7%, increases U.S. sugar TRQ, with no policy changes in other countries
Multilateral No Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except other countries change policies consistent
   with provisions of the October 2005 U.S. WTO proposal
Multilateral with Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except target prices set at baseline levels and
   direct payment rates increased by 7% of the baseline target price  
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U.S. Crop Returns and Payments 
 
Crop producer income is affected both by changes in commodity prices and by changes 
in government payments.  Table 7 reports national average returns and payments per 
acre, and should be interpreted with care.  The components are computed as follows: 
 
1) Market gross returns are simply the national average yield multiplied by the 
national average farm price. 
2) Loan program benefits are the product of the national average yield and the 
average loan deficiency payment or marketing loan gain per unit. 
3) The sum of market gross returns and loan program benefits is a measure of returns 
to producers that are tied to current production levels. 
4) CCPs are reported on a per-base-acre basis, and are the result of the following 
formula: (Target price minus direct payment rate minus max[farm price, loan 
rate]) multiplied by the national average CCP program yield, multiplied by 0.85. 
5) Direct payments per base acre are equal to the direct payment rate multiplied by 
the national average direct payment yield, multiplied by 0.85. 
6) “Gross returns with payments” is the sum of the components, assuming a 
producer has one base acre of the commodity for each acre harvested.   
7) “Net returns with payments” simply subtracts variable production expenses from 
the gross returns with payments. 
 
The assumption that producers have one base acre of the commodity in question for each 
acre harvested does not hold in practice.  National base acreage is often much larger 
(wheat, corn, cotton, rice) than actual planted or harvested acreage, and sometimes much 
smaller (soybeans).  Differences are often even larger at the farm level.   
 
In the Unilateral scenario, reduced marketing loan benefits and CCPs significantly 
reduce producer returns with payments, as small increases in market prices are 
inadequate to compensate for often large reductions in payments. 
 
In the Multilateral No Compensation scenario, larger price increases than in the 
Unilateral scenario improve the income picture.  A large increase in rice prices is 
adequate to offset a significant reduction in payments.  The wheat price increase is 
smaller, but so is the reduction in payments, and the national average return with 
payments increases slightly. 
 
For corn and soybeans, higher prices than in the Unilateral scenario mitigate the effects 
of reduced payments, but on average, producer returns with payments still fall short of 
baseline levels.  The largest shortfalls relative to the baseline occur for cotton. 
 
In the Multilateral with Compensation scenario, the increase in direct payments 
increases the income of producers with base acreage relative to the other scenarios.  Only 
for cotton does the average sum of market returns and payments per base acre remain 
slightly below baseline levels.  Results assume payment limitation rules are relaxed so 
that producers are eligible to receive the increase in direct payments. 
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Table 7. U.S. crop returns and payments 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
Corn (dollars per acre)
Market gross returns 373.18 1.58 14.46 13.94 0.4% 3.9% 3.7%
Loan program benefits 12.63 -9.56 -10.82 -10.78 -75.7% -85.7% -85.4%
Market + loan gross returns 385.81 -7.98 3.64 3.16 -2.1% 0.9% 0.8%
(dollars per corn base acre)
Counter-cyclical payment 13.80 -7.35 -9.29 -9.22 -53.3% -67.3% -66.8%
Direct payment 24.37 0.00 0.00 16.02 0.0% 0.0% 65.8%
(dollars per base acre planted to corn)
Gross returns with payments 423.97 -15.33 -5.65 9.97 -3.6% -1.3% 2.4%
Net returns with payments 241.70 -15.31 -5.65 9.97 -6.3% -2.3% 4.1%
Soybeans (dollars per acre)
Market gross returns 226.17 0.82 3.42 2.99 0.4% 1.5% 1.3%
Loan program benefits 11.48 -7.93 -8.33 -8.26 -69.0% -72.6% -71.9%
Market + loan gross returns 237.65 -7.10 -4.91 -5.27 -3.0% -2.1% -2.2%
(dollars per soybean base acre)
Counter-cyclical payment 4.34 -1.26 -1.53 -1.49 -29.1% -35.3% -34.2%
Direct payment 11.52 0.00 0.00 10.63 0.0% 0.0% 92.3%
(dollars per base acre planted to soybeans)
Gross returns with payments 253.51 -8.37 -6.45 3.88 -3.3% -2.5% 1.5%
Net returns with payments 144.02 -8.36 -6.45 3.88 -5.8% -4.5% 2.7%
Wheat (dollars per acre)
Market gross returns 158.56 0.14 4.54 4.14 0.1% 2.9% 2.6%
Loan program benefits 0.92 -0.83 -0.88 -0.88 -90.2% -95.8% -95.4%
Market + loan gross returns 159.48 -0.69 3.66 3.27 -0.4% 2.3% 2.0%
(dollars per wheat base acre)
Counter-cyclical payment 2.73 -1.94 -2.24 -2.21 -71.1% -82.1% -81.2%
Direct payment 15.25 0.00 0.00 8.05 0.0% 0.0% 52.8%
(dollars per base acre planted to wheat)
Gross returns with payments 177.45 -2.63 1.43 9.10 -1.5% 0.8% 5.1%
Net returns with payments 92.69 -2.62 1.43 9.10 -2.8% 1.5% 9.8%
Upland Cotton (dollars per acre)
Market gross returns 437.43 4.89 7.05 6.82 1.1% 1.6% 1.6%
Loan program benefits 47.18 -24.90 -25.87 -25.79 -52.8% -54.8% -54.7%
Market + loan gross returns 484.60 -20.02 -18.82 -18.97 -4.1% -3.9% -3.9%
(dollars per cotton base acre)
Counter-cyclical payment 63.07 -16.82 -17.90 -17.78 -26.7% -28.4% -28.2%
Direct payment 34.23 0.00 0.00 26.01 0.0% 0.0% 76.0%
(dollars per base acre planted to cotton)
Gross returns with payments 581.90 -36.83 -36.72 -10.74 -6.3% -6.3% -1.8%
Net returns with payments 198.71 -36.82 -36.72 -10.74 -18.5% -18.5% -5.4%
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Table 7. U.S. crop returns and payments, continued 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
Rice (dollars per acre)
Market gross returns 583.23 7.08 110.52 110.05 1.2% 18.9% 18.9%
Loan program benefits 62.99 -21.91 -46.82 -46.79 -34.8% -74.3% -74.3%
Market + loan gross returns 646.23 -14.83 63.70 63.26 -2.3% 9.9% 9.8%
(dollars per rice base acre)
Counter-cyclical payment 25.59 -8.32 -20.07 -20.03 -32.5% -78.4% -78.3%
Direct payment 96.13 0.00 0.00 30.06 0.0% 0.0% 31.3%
(dollars per base acre planted to rice)
Gross returns with payments 767.94 -23.15 43.63 73.30 -3.0% 5.7% 9.5%
Net returns with payments 376.76 -23.13 43.63 73.30 -6.1% 11.6% 19.5%
Sorghum (dollars per acre)
Market gross returns 143.95 0.68 4.66 4.27 0.5% 3.2% 3.0%
Loan program benefits 7.92 -5.49 -6.23 -6.16 -69.3% -78.7% -77.8%
Market + loan gross returns 151.86 -4.81 -1.57 -1.88 -3.2% -1.0% -1.2%
(dollars per sorghum base acre)
Counter-cyclical payment 5.51 -2.66 -3.31 -3.25 -48.2% -60.1% -59.0%
Direct payment 16.81 0.00 0.00 8.64 0.0% 0.0% 51.4%
(dollars per base acre planted to sorghum)
Gross returns with payments 174.19 -7.47 -4.88 3.51 -4.3% -2.8% 2.0%
Net returns with payments 58.78 -7.46 -4.88 3.51 -12.7% -8.3% 6.0%
Barley (dollars per acre)
Market gross returns 169.56 1.07 4.88 4.40 0.6% 2.9% 2.6%
Loan program benefits 5.69 -4.55 -4.98 -4.93 -79.9% -87.6% -86.8%
Market + loan gross returns 175.24 -3.47 -0.11 -0.54 -2.0% -0.1% -0.3%
(dollars per barley base acre)
Counter-cyclical payment 1.88 -1.22 -1.47 -1.44 -65.0% -78.3% -76.8%
Direct payment 11.42 0.00 0.00 7.46 0.0% 0.0% 65.3%
(dollars per base acre planted to barley)
Gross returns with payments 188.55 -4.69 -1.58 5.48 -2.5% -0.8% 2.9%
Net returns with payments 86.09 -4.69 -1.58 5.48 -5.4% -1.8% 6.4%
Oats (dollars per acre)
Market gross returns 102.85 0.43 4.44 3.87 0.4% 4.3% 3.8%
Loan program benefits 4.25 -2.91 -3.40 -3.33 -68.4% -79.9% -78.3%
Market + loan gross returns 107.11 -2.48 1.04 0.54 -2.3% 1.0% 0.5%
(dollars per oats base acre)
Counter-cyclical payment 0.70 -0.28 -0.43 -0.40 -40.2% -60.4% -57.6%
Direct payment 0.99 0.00 0.00 4.16 0.0% 0.0% 420.0%
(dollars per base acre planted to oats)
Gross returns with payments 108.80 -2.77 0.62 4.29 -2.5% 0.6% 3.9%
Net returns with payments 40.22 -2.76 0.62 4.29 -6.9% 1.5% 10.7%
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Table 7. U.S. crop returns and payments, continued 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
Peanuts (dollars per acre)
Market gross returns 610.70 14.90 17.30 16.55 2.4% 2.8% 2.7%
Loan program benefits 40.72 -25.37 -25.89 -25.72 -62.3% -63.6% -63.2%
Market + loan gross returns 651.42 -10.47 -8.59 -9.18 -1.6% -1.3% -1.4%
(dollars per peanut base acre)
Counter-cyclical payment 73.47 -31.44 -32.35 -32.02 -42.8% -44.0% -43.6%
Direct payment 45.73 0.00 0.00 44.01 0.0% 0.0% 96.3%
(dollars per base acre planted to peanuts)
Gross returns with payments 770.62 -41.91 -40.93 2.81 -5.4% -5.3% 0.4%
Net returns with payments 341.38 -41.91 -40.93 2.81 -12.3% -12.0% 0.8%
Sunflowerseed (dollars per acre)
Market gross returns 152.96 0.65 3.27 2.90 0.4% 2.1% 1.9%
Loan program benefits 5.20 -3.22 -3.56 -3.51 -62.0% -68.4% -67.5%
Market + loan gross returns 158.15 -2.57 -0.29 -0.61 -1.6% -0.2% -0.4%
(dollars per sunflower base acre)
Counter-cyclical payment 0.00 0.14 0.12 0.12 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Direct payment 7.37 0.00 0.00 6.52 0.0% 0.0% 88.4%
(dollars per base acre planted to sunflowers)
Gross returns with payments 165.53 -2.43 -0.17 6.03 -1.5% -0.1% 3.6%
Net returns with payments 93.04 -2.43 -0.17 6.03 -2.6% -0.2% 6.5%
Baseline:  Mean values from FAPRI early 2005 stochastic baseline, adjusted for elimination of Step 2 program
Unilateral No Compensation scenario: Reduces crop loan rates and milk price supports by 11%, sugar price
   supports by 16%, and target prices by 7%, increases U.S. sugar TRQ, with no policy changes in other countries
Multilateral No Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except other countries change policies consistent
   with provisions of the October 2005 U.S. WTO proposal
Multilateral with Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except target prices set at baseline levels and
   direct payment rates increased by 7% of the baseline target price  
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U.S. Dairy and Livestock Sector Results 
 
The reduction in dairy price supports results in a small average reduction in milk 
production and prices in the Unilateral scenario (Table 8).  In only a fraction of the 
stochastic outcomes does the price support program play an important role in determining 
milk prices, so the average impact of reducing supports is modest.  Note that the 
estimated $185 million per year average reduction in dairy market receipts corresponds 
with a $2 billion reduction in the AMS for dairy. 
 
In the Multilateral scenarios, reduced competition from the European Union results in a 
significant increase in world dairy product prices, making the U.S. competitive in world 
dairy markets even without the availability of the Dairy Export Incentive Program 
subsidies prohibited under the U.S. proposal.  Average milk prices exceed baseline levels 
by 1.4%.  The impacts of increased exports of most dairy products and reduced imports 
of cheese more than offset the impact of increased butter imports under an expanded 
TRQ. 
 
For livestock and poultry, the Unilateral scenario has only small impacts on supply, use, 
and prices (Table 9).  A slight increase in feed prices eventually translates into slightly 
less production and higher prices for livestock and poultry. 
 
The Multilateral scenarios have much larger impacts on livestock and poultry markets 
than the Unilateral scenario.  Lower Japanese tariffs translate into increased export 
demand for U.S. beef and pork.  Average fed steer prices increase by more than 3% 
relative to baseline levels between 2012 and 2014, and the increase in barrow and gilt 
prices exceeds 4%.  With a smaller proportional increase in exports, average broiler 
prices increase by a modest 2%. 
 
As discussed previously, the U.S. stochastic model does not include detailed 
representation of international markets.  To incorporate the effects of changes in policies 
in other countries resulting from implementation of the U.S. proposal, the stochastic 
model was calibrated to the results of the analysis conducted with FAPRI’s global 
deterministic modeling system. 
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Table 8. U.S. dairy sector results 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
(billion pounds)
Production 188.18 -0.56 1.55 1.55 -0.3% 0.8% 0.8%
(dollars per hundredweight)
All milk price 13.27 -0.06 0.19 0.19 -0.5% 1.4% 1.4%
(million dollars)
Dairy cash receipts 24,920 -185 572 572 -0.7% 2.3% 2.3%
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. U.S. livestock sector results 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
(million pounds)
Beef production 29,873 -2 300 300 0.0% 1.0% 1.0%
Pork production 22,530 -11 514 517 0.0% 2.3% 2.3%
Broiler production 42,489 -43 298 312 -0.1% 0.7% 0.7%
Turkey production 6,175 -1 38 38 0.0% 0.6% 0.6%
Beef exports 2,753 -2 650 650 -0.1% 23.6% 23.6%
Pork exports 2,819 -7 719 721 -0.3% 25.5% 25.6%
Broiler exports 6,364 -10 486 490 -0.2% 7.6% 7.7%
(dollars per hundredweight)
Cattle price, Nebraska steers 70.93 0.04 2.41 2.40 0.1% 3.4% 3.4%
Cattle price, OK City feeders 80.61 -0.05 3.64 3.66 -0.1% 4.5% 4.5%
Hog price, 51-52% lean 46.27 0.08 2.00 1.98 0.2% 4.3% 4.3%
Broiler price, 12-city 61.17 0.12 1.21 1.17 0.2% 2.0% 1.9%
Turkey east wholesale price 65.88 0.08 0.90 0.87 0.1% 1.4% 1.3%
Baseline:  Mean values from FAPRI early 2005 stochastic baseline, adjusted for elimination of Step 2 program
Unilateral No Compensation scenario: Reduces crop loan rates and milk price supports by 11%, sugar price
   supports by 16%, and target prices by 7%, increases U.S. sugar TRQ, with no policy changes in other countries
Multilateral No Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except other countries change policies consistent
   with provisions of the October 2005 U.S. WTO proposal
Multilateral with Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except target prices set at baseline levels and
   direct payment rates increased by 7% of the baseline target price  
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U.S. Government Farm Program Outlays 
 
Reducing target prices and loan rates and dairy price supports has a significant negative 
effect on farm program outlays in the Unilateral scenario (Table 10).  Net Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC) outlays decline relative to baseline levels by an average of 
$3.5 billion per year between fiscal years 2012 and 2014.  The largest absolute reductions 
occur for the commodities with the greatest levels of baseline outlays: corn, upland 
cotton, and soybeans.   
 
The reduction in wheat outlays is relatively modest.  This occurs because average wheat 
prices are well above the levels that would trigger marketing loan expenditures under 
normal conditions, and even CCPs occur infrequently in the stochastic baseline. 
 
As indicated in Table 11, the reduced marketing loan benefits account for most of the 
reduction in government payments.  The sum of changes in marketing loan benefits and 
CCPs is less than the overall change in net CCC outlays.  Costs of the dairy and sugar 
price support programs and other CCC costs not resulting in payments to producers also 
decline slightly from baseline levels. 
 
Results of the Multilateral No Compensation scenario are similar to the Unilateral 
scenario, except the cost reductions are slightly larger for most commodities.  While U.S. 
policy assumptions are the same as in the Unilateral scenario, higher commodity prices 
because of increased export demand translate into reduced marketing loan and CCP 
expenditures.  Net reductions relative to the baseline average $4.0 billion per year from 
2012-2014. 
 
In the Multilateral with Compensation scenario, a $3.4 billion per year increase in 
direct payments has a slightly larger impact on net CCC outlays relative to the no 
compensation scenario.  Overall, average net CCC outlays remain lower than the baseline 
by almost $600 million per year. 
 
Outlay impacts differ across commodities.  The increase in direct payments still leaves 
corn, rice, soybean, cotton, and peanut expenditures below baseline levels.  No policy 
changes were made for sugar or dairy relative to the no compensation scenario so 
spending for those commodities also remains below baseline levels.  For wheat and 
several other commodities, however, the increase in direct payments more than offsets 
reductions in marketing loan and CCP expenditures, and spending exceeds baseline 
levels.   
 
Note that the level of direct payments and the formula used in the scenario are somewhat 
arbitrary.  By increasing direct payments by 7% of baseline target prices, given current 
payment formulas, the net effect on CCPs was essentially identical to the result of simply 
reducing target prices by 7 percent.  The main point of the analysis is that, provided direct 
payments are classified as green box payments, it is possible to offset some or all of the 
impacts of reduced amber and blue box support by increasing direct payments without 
increasing overall government expenditures above baseline levels. 
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Table 10. U.S. net Commodity Credit Corporation outlays 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
Feed grains (million dollars, fiscal year)
  Corn 4,417 -1,446 -1,718 -317 -32.7% -38.9% -7.2%
  Sorghum 333 -73 -86 18 -21.9% -26.0% 5.4%
  Barley 140 -38 -43 13 -26.9% -30.8% 8.9%
  Oats 13 -6 -8 6 -48.3% -58.7% 42.8%
Food grains
  Wheat 1,508 -214 -243 366 -14.2% -16.1% 24.3%
  Rice 801 -128 -270 -135 -16.0% -33.7% -16.8%
Oilseeds
  Soybeans 1,698 -666 -699 -131 -39.2% -41.2% -7.7%
  Peanuts 230 -80 -82 -17 -34.9% -35.8% -7.5%
  Other oilseeds 34 -8 -9 9 -24.6% -27.0% 26.5%
Other commodities
  Upland cotton 2,615 -672 -718 -236 -25.7% -27.5% -9.0%
  Sugar 35 -15 -15 -15 -44.0% -44.0% -44.0%
  Dairy 167 -129 -130 -130 -76.9% -77.6% -77.6%
Other net costs 4,545 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Net CCC outlays 16,537 -3,475 -4,021 -569 -21.0% -24.3% -3.4%
 
 
 
Table 11. U.S. selected government payments 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
(million dollars, crop year)
Direct payments 5,304 0 0 3,422 0.0% 0.0% 64.5%
Marketing loan benefits 2,882 -1,886 -2,126 -2,114 -65.4% -73.8% -73.3%
Counter-cyclical payments 3,094 -1,280 -1,573 -1,558 -41.4% -50.8% -50.4%
  Total 11,281 -3,166 -3,698 -250 -28.1% -32.8% -2.2%
Baseline:  Mean values from FAPRI early 2005 stochastic baseline, adjusted for elimination of Step 2 program
Unilateral No Compensation scenario: Reduces crop loan rates and milk price supports by 11%, sugar price
   supports by 16%, and target prices by 7%, increases U.S. sugar TRQ, with no policy changes in other countries
Multilateral No Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except other countries change policies consistent
   with provisions of the October 2005 U.S. WTO proposal
Multilateral with Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except target prices set at baseline levels and
   direct payment rates increased by 7% of the baseline target price  
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U.S. Net Farm Income and Farm Real Estate Values 
 
In the Unilateral scenario reduced government payments are not offset by a change in 
cash receipts (Table 12).  Crop receipts increase marginally, as an increase in prices for 
most crops outweighs the reduction in sugar prices and receipts.  Livestock receipts 
decline, because of the drop in dairy receipts due to the reduction in support prices.  
 
With reduced returns to producers, the model estimates that net rental payments to non-
operator landlords would decline significantly.  In addition, reduced acreage of cotton 
and rice, in particular, translate into some modest reductions in other production costs.  
Overall, an average $3.2 billion per year reduction in government payments causes net 
farm income to decline by an average of $1.9 billion per year from 2012 to 2014. 
 
In the Multilateral No Compensation scenario, cash receipts are more than $6 billion 
per year higher than in the Unilateral scenario.  Crop cash receipts increase by $2 billion 
per year above baseline levels, due to higher prices for rice, corn, wheat and most crops 
other than sugar.  Livestock receipts increase by $4.2 billion per year.  Cattle receipts 
increase the most in absolute terms, but receipts also increase for hogs, poultry, and milk.  
 
The increase in overall cash receipts from marketings exceeds the reduction in 
government payments by $2.5 billion per year.  Rental payments are higher than in the 
Unilateral scenario, but remain below baseline levels as crop receipts plus payments still 
fall short of baseline levels, even though livestock sector profitability increases.  Other 
production expenses increase relative to baseline, as increased production and higher 
grain prices result in increased expenditures on feed, purchased livestock, and other 
inputs.  The net impact is to increase net farm income by $1.3 billion per year from 
baseline levels. 
 
Note that the estimates do not include any possible impacts of the U.S. proposal on 
receipts from fruits, vegetables, nursery crops, and other products not treated separately 
in the FAPRI model.  These effects could be important for particular products, and it is 
important to note that “other crops” not included separately in the FAPRI model account 
for about half of U.S. crop cash receipts from marketings. 
 
In the Multilateral with Compensation scenario, market receipts are almost as high as 
in the No Compensation scenario, but government payments are more than $3.4 billion 
higher.  The resulting increase in receipts plus payments by the crop sector leaves rental 
payments above baseline levels, but has only a modest impact on other production costs.  
Net farm income exceeds baseline levels by $3.4 billion per year from 2012 to 2014. 
 
Farm real estate values in the FAPRI model change in response to many of the same 
factors that affect rental expenses, so a similar pattern emerges (Table 13).  Farm real 
estate values fall relative to the baseline in the Unilateral and Multilateral No 
Compensation scenarios, but exceed baseline values in the Multilateral with 
Compensation scenario.  Factors other than net market returns and payments affect land 
values, but profitability continues to play an important role. 
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Table 12. U.S. net farm income 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
(million dollars, calendar year)
Crop cash receipts 125,125 71 2,006 1,989 0.1% 1.6% 1.6%
Livestock cash receipts 112,190 -122 4,216 4,195 -0.1% 3.8% 3.7%
Government payments 16,655 -3,226 -3,754 -303 -19.4% -22.5% -1.8%
   Sum of above 253,971 -3,277 2,469 5,881 -1.3% 1.0% 2.3%
Net rent to non-operators 13,215 -1,095 -488 705 -8.3% -3.7% 5.3%
Other production expenses 224,490 -395 1,901 2,069 -0.2% 0.8% 0.9%
   Total production expenses 237,704 -1,489 1,413 2,774 -0.6% 0.6% 1.2%
All other net income 36,823 -115 222 337 -0.3% 0.6% 0.9%
Net farm income 53,089 -1,903 1,278 3,444 -3.6% 2.4% 6.5%
Baseline:  Mean values from FAPRI early 2005 stochastic baseline, adjusted for elimination of Step 2 program
Unilateral No Compensation scenario: Reduces crop loan rates and milk price supports by 11%, sugar price
   supports by 16%, and target prices by 7%, increases U.S. sugar TRQ, with no policy changes in other countries
Multilateral No Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except other countries change policies consistent
   with provisions of the October 2005 U.S. WTO proposal
Multilateral with Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except target prices set at baseline levels and
   direct payment rates increased by 7% of the baseline target price  
 
 
 
 
Table 13. U.S. farm real estate values 
Absolute 2012-14 Effects of: Proportional 2012-14 Effects of:
Baseline Unilateral Multilateral Changes Unilateral Multilateral Changes
2012-14 No Com- No Com- With Com- No Com- No Com- With Com-
Average pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation pensation
(dollars per acre)
National average 1,797 -51.73 -25.13 30.12 -2.9% -1.4% 1.7%
Baseline:  Mean values from FAPRI early 2005 stochastic baseline, adjusted for elimination of Step 2 program
Unilateral No Compensation scenario: Reduces crop loan rates and milk price supports by 11%, sugar price
   supports by 16%, and target prices by 7%, increases U.S. sugar TRQ, with no policy changes in other countries
Multilateral No Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except other countries change policies consistent
   with provisions of the October 2005 U.S. WTO proposal
Multilateral with Compensation scenario:  Same as above, except target prices set at baseline levels and
   direct payment rates increased by 7% of the baseline target price  
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Appendix A: Impacts of Eliminating the Cotton Step 2 Program 
 
As indicated in the introduction and the section describing U.S. policy assumptions, the 
baseline used for this analysis is the FAPRI January 2005 baseline, adjusted for the 
elimination of the cotton Step 2 program. 
 
The Step 2 program provides payments to users of U.S. cotton.  A WTO ruling in a case 
brought against the U.S. cotton program by Brazil said the Step 2 program was 
inconsistent with U.S. obligations and should be eliminated.  The Bush Administration 
proposed the program be eliminated, and both Houses of Congress have included 
elimination of Step 2 in budget reconciliation bills approved in recent months.  While 
final conference action on the budget reconciliation bill has not occurred, it seems 
reasonable to expect that Congress will act to eliminate the program.  It also seems 
reasonable to ascribe the elimination of Step 2 to U.S. obligations under the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture, rather than to a prospective Doha agreement. 
 
The impacts of removing the Step 2 program are shown in Table A.1., which is 
reproduced from a recent FAPRI report examining impacts of provisions of the House 
and Senate reconciliation bills (FAPRI-UMC Report #15-05, at www.fapri.missouri.edu).  
 
Without Step 2 payments U.S. cotton is more expensive to U.S. and foreign millers, even 
with the reduction in U.S. producer prices, so the result is a modest reduction in domestic 
mill use and a significantly larger reduction in exports.  The reduction in demand for U.S. 
cotton results in a reduction in U.S. producer prices, which closes part of the gap between 
world and domestic cotton prices.  Lower producer prices translate into a reduction in 
U.S. cotton acreage and production. 
 
Between 2006 and 2010, the net effect of the elimination of Step 2 is to reduce U.S. 
producer prices for cotton by approximately 1.3 cents per pound (2.7%), while increasing 
world prices as measured by the A-Index by about 0.4 cents per pound (0.7%).
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Table A.1. Impacts of eliminating the cotton Step 2 program in 2006/07 
2006-10
Crop year 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 Average
Area (million acres)
   Planted area 0.00 -0.28 -0.26 -0.23 -0.23 -0.25 -0.28 -0.20
   Harvested area 0.00 -0.25 -0.24 -0.21 -0.21 -0.22 -0.25 -0.18
(million bales)
Supply 0.00 -0.17 -0.19 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.14
   Beginning stocks 0.00 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.14
   Production 0.00 -0.37 -0.35 -0.32 -0.31 -0.34 -0.39 -0.27
   Imports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Domestic use
   Mill use -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
Exports -0.19 -0.31 -0.32 -0.30 -0.31 -0.35 -0.37 -0.29
Total use -0.20 -0.33 -0.34 -0.33 -0.34 -0.37 -0.40 -0.31
Ending stocks 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.17
Prices (cents)
   Farm price/lb. -1.27 -1.17 -1.15 -1.26 -1.45 -1.66 -1.75 -1.26
   Market price/lb. -1.73 -1.59 -1.57 -1.71 -1.98 -2.25 -2.37 -1.72
   Step 2 payment/lb. -2.37 -2.40 -2.27 -2.36 -2.69 -3.06 -3.24 -2.42
   Price paid by U.S. mills/lb. 0.63 0.81 0.71 0.65 0.71 0.81 0.86 0.70
   Cotlook A Index/lb. 0.41 0.50 0.38 0.31 0.34 0.40 0.43 0.39
   Adjusted world price/lb. 0.41 0.50 0.38 0.31 0.34 0.40 0.43 0.39
 
 
Source: FAPRI estimates of impacts of provisions of the House and Senate reconciliation 
bills, as reported in FAPRI-UMC Report #15-05. 
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Appendix B. U.S. Sugar Sector Results 
 
The FAPRI U.S. stochastic model currently does not include a component for the sugar 
sector, so there are no stochastic results for sugar comparable to those reported for other 
crop and livestock products.  FAPRI does maintain a deterministic model of the U.S. 
sugar sector, and this model was used to generate estimated impacts of the U.S. proposal 
as part of FAPRI’s global analysis.  For purposes of this report, those deterministic 
estimates were used as the sugar sector estimates for all three scenarios. 
 
Table B.1 summarizes the deterministic results.  The baseline was prepared in January 
2005, so it does not reflect 2005 developments, including the passage of the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement-Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) and the effects of 
hurricane damage in Louisiana and Florida.  CAFTA-DR will, all else equal, result in 
higher U.S. imports than in this baseline.  This year’s hurricane damage has resulted in 
significant reductions in U.S. sugar supplies in the short run, but it is not clear that it will 
have a major effect on the long-run outlook. 
 
In the U.S. proposal scenario, it is assumed that the United States designates sugar to be a 
sensitive product.  The analysis assumes that the TRQ of sensitive products must be 
increased by 7.5% of the 1999-2001 average level of domestic consumption.  In the case 
of U.S. sugar, this translates into an import increase of 755,000 short tons.  In addition to 
the increase in imports, the analysis also assumes a 16% reduction in raw cane sugar and 
refined beet sugar loan rates.  This is larger than the assumed 11% reduction in loan rates 
for other crops, because applying the smaller percentage reduction would have resulted in 
an accumulation of CCC stocks that was judged unsustainable.  A 16% reduction leaves 
CCC stocks above baseline levels in some years and below baseline levels in others, 
including the 2012/13-2014/15 period shown in Table B.1. 
 
The increase in imports and reduction in loan rates result in lower U.S. sugar prices.  
These lower prices cause reductions in U.S. production and increases in U.S. 
consumption of sugar.  The production decline is fairly modest, averaging only 2.3% 
between 2012/13 and 2014/15.  This occurs because allotments were in place in the 
baseline, and the allotments were assumed to constrain production.  With the estimated 
increase in U.S. sugar imports, it is assumed the allotment program would be eliminated 
(one reading of current law is that allotments cannot be operated when imports exceed a 
trigger level).  All else equal, the elimination of allotments would result in increased 
sugar production, but the effect of lower sugar prices more than offsets this effect, 
leaving sugar production slightly below baseline levels.  The estimated decline in yields 
for sugar cane results from a reduction in area in Hawaii, the highest-yielding state. 
 
Reduced prices for sugar also have important effects on the market for sweeteners.  
Reduced sugar prices have a direct effect in increasing sugar consumption, but they also 
have indirect effects.  The reduction in sugar prices translates into a modest reduction in 
prices for high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS), and increases in corn exports and feed 
demand result in higher corn prices.  The result is a slight reduction in HFCS production 
and consumption, which also contributes to increased consumption of sugar. 
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Table B.1.  U.S. sugar sector results 
Baseline Multilateral, No Compensation Scenario
2012-14 2012-14 Change from Baseline
Average Average Absolute Proportional
Sugar beets
   Harv. area (1,000 a.) 1,221 1,191 -30 -2.5%
   Yield (tons/a.) 23.16 23.15 -0.01 0.0%
   Production (1,000 tons) 28,268 27,564 -704 -2.5%
Sugarcane
   Harv. area (1,000 a.) 848 841 -7 -0.8%
   Yield (tons/a.) 37.16 36.65 -0.51 -1.4%
   Production (1,000 tons) 31,513 30,837 -676 -2.1%
Raw sugar
Supply 12,783 13,448 666 5.2%
   Beginning stocks 2,189 2,332 143 6.6%
   Production 8,623 8,422 -201 -2.3%
      Beet sugar 4,708 4,591 -117 -2.5%
      Cane sugar 3,915 3,831 -84 -2.1%
   Imports 1,971 2,695 724 36.7%
      Tariff-rate quota 1,562 2,286 724 46.3%
          Duty-free NAFTA 333 301 -32 -9.6%
          Other TRQ 1,229 1,984 755 61.5%
      Other program 350 350 0 0.0%
      High-tier and other 59 59 0 0.0%
 
Disappearance 10,557 11,133 576 5.5%
   Domestic deliveries 10,345 10,909 565 5.5%
   Exports 212 224 11 5.3%
   Statistical discrepancy 0 0 0 n.a.
Ending stocks 2,226 2,316 90 4.0%
   CCC 356 306 -49 -13.9%
   Other 1,870 2,009 139 7.4%
Prices
   N.Y. spot raw sugar 20.49 17.96 -2.52 -12.3%
   Refined beet sugar 23.05 19.54 -3.50 -15.2%
   Cane loan rate 18.00 15.12 -2.88 -16.0%
   Beet loan rate 22.90 19.24 -3.66 -16.0%
Baseline:  FAPRI January 2005 deterministic baseline
Multilateral No Compensation scenario:  Reduces grain, oilseed and cotton loan 
   rates and milk price supports by 11%, sugar loan rates by 16%, and target prices
   by 7%, increases U.S. sugar TRQ, and makes changes in other countries' policies 
   consistent with provisions of the October 2005 U.S. WTO proposal  
